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AREA OR COUNTRY(S)	ORGANIZATIONS	FUNCTIONS & TOPICS	PERSONALITIES	DOCUMENT
HQ	CIA	History		DATE: 1946
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	ONE	Intel dissemination		1953
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[] "Miscellaneous Draft," Subject: "CIA Background History, 17 drafts, 372 pp.				HS/HC - 22, 23, 24 ✓

ABSTRACT

These drafts deal with the background history of CIA primarily the Smith period. Titles and dates of drafts: "Vandenberg Stage", 1946; "1946-1950 period; "CIA Experience Before Establishment of O/NE," 1946-1950; "Main Steps in Development of ORE", 1947-1950, "The Merger of the Staff and Current Intelligence Groups," 1949; "Defense Project, (Report for Mr. Darling by GSJ)," 1946-1950; "Development of CRS-ORE," Feb. 1946-July 1947; "Developments During 1948," 1948; "Background 1946-1953," 1946-1953; "Functions," 1946-1950; "CIA Production of Estimates and Related Intelligence," 1946-1952; "Historical Staff Interviews," 1950-1953; "The Central Intelligence Group Idea," undated; "Thesis," undated; "Comment on NSA 102 (e) "Dissemination," undated; "Definitions," undated.

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*Central Reports Staff

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LIST OF CHAPTERS AS NOW PLANNED

[1950-51 history]

- I Evolution of the Organization Inherited by General Smith
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- III Organization for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities
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Relating to the National Security
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HRP

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COMMENT ON NSA 102 (e) "DISSEMINATION"

(Note: This comment was discussed on November 17, 1955, with L. R. Houston, CIA General Counsel, who considered it a reasonable brief statement of the case.)

The National Security Act of 1947 put a positive duty on CIA to disseminate to appropriate agencies within the Government correlated and evaluated intelligence relating to the national security. This is specific and positive and is the direct result of the Pearl Harbor investigation which showed that failure to disseminate intelligence was among the causes of the disaster. Related to this duty is the clause (section 102 (e)) allowing for inspection of the intelligence agencies by the DCI; plus the provision (d-4) that CIA shall perform "services of common concern".

In order to direct a system under which there would be a minimum possibility of non-dissemination such as occurred at Pearl Harbor, the DCI would need to take full advantage of the "inspection" clause because otherwise he would have no way of knowing whether or not material requiring dissemination had been received in any given department. He would also need whatever authority might be granted by the NSC to assure that such material would be disseminated to all appropriate officials. On the other hand, to provide for dissemination of intelligence as a "service of common concern", he would need only to construct machinery, within the central agency, adequate for the purpose of routing information.

The ideal of centrally assured dissemination is in conflict with certain realities of intelligence. Information classifiable

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Draft by
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as intelligence by general standards, may be deemed unavailable for intelligence purposes by a department of the government in which intelligence is only a supporting function for broader purposes. Thus the business of the Department of Defense is to prosecute and be prepared for war, while that of the Department of State is to formulate and execute foreign policy. Information directly related to these purposes may constitute intelligence under given definitions of the term but is not so considered by these departments which will, therefore, not free it for distribution in intelligence channels. If this principle were disturbed through insistence upon a prescribed distribution of such materials, the implications for the operating departments would be most difficult.

Perhaps in consequence of these facts, the adoption of a central dissemination system such as may have been intended by Congress under the terms of the National Security Act has never been found feasible. Instead, the actual responsibility for dissemination has devolved upon the Intelligence Advisory Council (subject of course to the NSC) where ultimate decisions as to dissemination are made.

A "service of common concern" with respect to dissemination became a function of the Office of Collection and Dissemination of CIA which served both as a distribution center within CIA and a central clearing house for the routing of intelligence within the government.

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The story of Central Intelligence is generally told in terms of conflict in which there are villains and heroes. Donovan is seen as a great man outmaneuvered by little politicians (or as a too ambitious would-be dictator whose removal from the scene was a victory for Right) Vandenberg charges fearlessly into the ranks of the enemy and achieves a ~~victory~~ temporary victory (or Vandenberg was an impulsive ariman whose misguided efforts were providentially cubbed.) Hillenkoetter was an able Director whose impulse was to make a workable CIA, but he was knifed in the back by self-seekers.(or Hillenkoetter was a bumbling idiot whose ineptness brought Central INtelli ence to the brink of disaster.) Smith was Superman who flew to the scene of disaster and achieved immediate triumph by the use of his magic cape (or Smith, as the representative of the cutthroats, weilded the knife.)

All this, whatever in it may be true or false, seems irrelevant. It is true that CIA was born of conflict, that that conflict has ~~never~~ not been resolved, and that quite possibly it never will be. But the conflict is not important. Instead of giving it such att ention, it might pay to look at the achievements tht have taken place apart from or in spite of the conflict.

The conflict arose because the decision was not made as to whether to create

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a Central Intelligence Agency or not to create a Central Intelligence Agency. The first agreement---that of January 22, 1946---did not do so. It authorized a coordinating Group which is quite a different thing. Subsequently, however, development took place that had the effect of superimposing a Central Intelligence Agency on the Group and on the intelligence structure of which it was a part.

It was at this point that the Director's role became dual. He was still Director of Central Intelligence---the appointed coordinator of the government intelligence structure---but he had become Director of an Agency also. But this Agency was not a Central Intelligence Agency except in name. It was rather the apparatus through which the Director performed certain of his legal functions. Possession of this apparatus made the Director more nearly independent of the established intelligence structure than he could otherwise have been. But it did not make him wholly independent nor did it give him any direct control over the established structure.

This may and may not have been an unfortunate situation. ~~Thezidagmexofzaz~~ Conflict was unavoidable. The extent depended on the outlook and actions of the Director.

The true measure of Central Intelligence, however, is not in the conflict and

its consequences. A better measure is in a comparison of US intelligence before, ~~during~~ and after the war.

Before the war, the US could not pretend to have ^{foreign} an intelligence service, ILLEGIB
central or otherwise.

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The war quickly proved the fallacy in such a situation. Responsibility for Pearl Harbor is not the point; there is no proof that the Pearl Harbor disaster would not have happened if the intelligence system had been stronger. What was shown was that the sort of intelligence system then in effect, there was no defense against a Pearl Harbor. Whatever may have been right, what was wrong. The progress of the war further proved the weakness of pre-war intelligence. Maps and basic in-

telligence on important military objectives did not exist in the US. Target data for air bombardment, when it became organized, was not available. Whatever the faults or virtues of OSS, it, or something like it, had to be improvised. Many of its weaknesses were obviously a consequence of its improvisation. There is no telling how much greater those weaknesses might have been if OSS had not had the advantage of British experience. OWI became a quasi-intelligence as well as a propaganda agency, collecting foreign information from ~~news and broadcasts~~ foreign newspapers and broadcasts. The end of the war found numerous agencies independently collecting and exploiting the intelligence left in its wake in the form of such enterprises as document acquisition, bomb surveys, and interrogations.